When you understand this you can move forward from “the ignorance is bliss”, “fools paradise” towards taking sensible mitigation steps.īut then I’ve said this several times before, but I don’t see people doing it… thus I can only conclude they have absolutly no interest in their actuall privacy or those they owe a duty of care towards. Just remember not to give way to those that say “there’s never been a security fault with XXX” where XXX is an application, the simple facts are,ġ, Not knowing of any fault is not proof of no faults.Ģ, You are using a system of many parts even in the remote and unlikely event the application is secure that says nothing about the OS or Hardware. Thus puting any trust in any of these security applications that have the Human Interface and communications end point on the same device by definition can not be secure at any time. Thus any SigInt agency, LEA or other “Guard Labour” organisation or criminal need only get access to the router one step upstream of Carrier IQ to harvest the plain text of nearly every US mobile phone user… However it sent all the plaintext of SMS etc over the Internet in “plaintext” to Carrier IQ’s servers. This is not a matter of conjecture it’s been done in the past, look up “Carrier IQ” this was put on many US phones by US mobile carriers as a “tech support” aid. Thus it’s easily possible for those that do to “tee off the plaintext device driver” and send a copy of the plaintext to the “communications device driver” thus entirely bypassing any security the app might have.
HOW TO WORK WHISPER APP DRIVERS
Neither you nor the application have any control over the OS and device drivers on most devices. Also the app passes plaintext through the same OS user area, kernal area and a different set of device drivers for the “human interface” hardware.
HOW TO WORK WHISPER APP DRIVER
With all the apps as they currently are pass ciphertext through through the OS user area, to the kernal area and then on to the device driver for the “communications” hardware. Whilst it might sound like a bold contrarian statement, it isn’t, it’s a statment of practical reality.Īn application is entirely usless on it’s own, it needs to run on an operating system which in turn provides connectivity to most of the hardware on your device. I have said and will continue to say none of the existing messaging apps are secure in use.
![how to work whisper app how to work whisper app](https://www.mobupdates.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Untitled.png)
HOW TO WORK WHISPER APP FOR ANDROID
What are some alternatives to Signal and Whisper? For Android and iOS? Tags: blackmail, children, data collection, data loss, leaks, secret sharing
![how to work whisper app how to work whisper app](https://i2.cdn.turner.com/money/dam/assets/151210170242-whisper-on-phone-640x360.jpg)
I hope people didn’t confess things from their bedrooms. The data also included the location coordinates of the users’ last submitted post, many of which pointed back to specific schools, workplaces and residential neighborhoods. The exposed records did not include real names but did include a user’s stated age, ethnicity, gender, hometown, nickname and any membership in groups, many of which are devoted to sexual confessions and discussion of sexual orientation and desires. A Post reporter was able to freely browse and search through the records, many of which involved children: A search of users who had listed their age as 15 returned 1.3 million results. The records were viewable on a non-password-protected database open to the public Web. Whisper, the secret-sharing app that called itself the “safest place on the Internet,” left years of users’ most intimate confessions exposed on the Web tied to their age, location and other details, raising alarm among cybersecurity researchers that users could have been unmasked or blackmailed. The Whisper Secret-Sharing App Exposed Locations